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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
21
the goods subsequently shipped actually matched the sample exhibited. 22If the
seller fails to prove that fact he can not insist upon acceptance by the buyer.

Since the defendant did not meet the burden of proof the judgment for him
was reversed and a new trial ordered. For another reason for reversal and a new
trial, the dissent in the Appellate Division23 makes interesting reading, especially
as to the facts which provoked the following statement: "Here, because of the'wellintended but unfortunate remarks of the trial court, the jury took the easy way
produced
out and to avoid buying their dinners and being kept late in the evening,
24
a verdict. The plaintiff, in effect, was deprived of his day in court:

Implied Warranties
Plaintiff became ill with jaundice after receiving a transfusion of contaminated
blood as a part of her treatment while a patient at the defendant hospital, and
for which she paid sixty dollars. The complaint alleged a breach of implied
warranties of fitness of purpose and merchantability. The Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
that the
to state a cause of action. 25 The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
28
transaction did not constitute a sale to which warranties could attach.
Section 96 of the Personal Property Law provides for implied warranties
28
Whether a transaction
of quality on a contract to sell27 or a sale of goods
involving personal services in which there has been a transfer of title in goods
is or can be considered a contract to sell, within the meaning of this section for
purposes of a warranty in all cases, had not been directly answered before this
case; with the exception of the above mentioned statute, the Sales Act contains no
criterion which can be applied in deciding whether a contract is'for a sale or for
services, although a statutory test is provided in Statute of Frauds cases for a
21. Frankel v. Foreman & Clark, 33 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929), applying the
law of New York; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 255 at 677 (rev. fed. 1948).
22. A. & S. Henry & Co. v. Talcott, 175 N. Y. 385, 67 N. E. 617 (1903); 4
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 1002 at 2762 (rev. ed. 1936).

23. 284 App. Div. 954, 135 N. Y. S. 2d 52 (lsft Dep't 1954).
24. Id. at 956, 135 N. Y. S. 2d at 56.
25. 283 App. Div. 789, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 232 (1st Dep't 1954).
26. 308 N. Y. 100, 123 N. E. 2d 792 (1955).
27. Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N. Y. Supp. 266 (1936), held that there
must be a contract to sell before implied warranties can arise.
28. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw § 82: "A sale of goods is an agreement

whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price." "A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller
agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer X r a consideration called
the price."
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similar distinction. 29 Prior to the instant case, the courts encountered the problem
most frequently in restaurant cases, where the serving of food was held to
constitute a "qualified sale" despite the existence of personal services.30 One case
held an action in breach of warranty could lie where the transaction called for the
installation of a heating system, although admitting the importance of the personal
services involved. 3 ' It would appear that the courts used a case by case approach
in finding a sale for purposes of warranty wherever possible, without the use of
any specific criteria.
The majority in the instant case found that the transaction was not a sale
within the meaning of section 96, since the contract between the hospital and the
patient essentially called for the rendition of services, and a transfer of title in
goods does not result in an automatic sale where it is wholly incidental to the
main object of the contract. New York restaurant cases are distinguishable on the
ground that the customer's primary object is the purchase of food.3 2 The Court
supported its position by citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions, where a
similar distinction between a contract to sell and one to perform services was
made in deciding a warranty. The cases are of questionable authority, however,
since the applicability of a sale to a warranty was not in issue.33 The New York
decision relied on by the Court, which held that a contract to paint a portrait was
one for services although title to the painting passed, also arose in a different
context.3 4 It is to be pointed out that the Court was most anxious to find a sale,
since any other result would render the hospital an insurer under these circumstances.
The dissenters contended that the decision disregarded prevailing rules of
29.

N.

Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw § 85 (2); for purposes of the Statute of

Frauds, a contract to sell or a sale of goods not yet in existence Is considered
to be a sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for
the burer and are not suitable for sale in the ordinary course of the seller's
business, the contract is for services.
30.. Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924).
31. Miller v. Winters, 144 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1913).
32. Temple v. Keeler, supra note 30.
33. In Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 fll. 626, 12 N. E. 2d 635 (1937), the
transaction was held to be a contract for services rather than a contract of sale,
for purposes of imposing an occupational tax. Town of Saugus v. B. Perini c
Sons Inc., 305 Mass. 403, 26 N. E. 2d 1 (1940), was an action brought to enjoin a
defendant from removing gravel in violation of an ordinance prohibiting such
removal for purposes of a sale. The Court held that the defendant was removing
the gravel under a contract for services, thus making the ordinance inapplicable.
See Crystal Recreation Inc. v. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men, 34 Wash. 553, 209
P. 2d 358 (1949) (a distinction between a contract for services and one for sale
to determine a question of title).
34. Racklin Fagim Construction Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N. Y.

Supp. 426 (1935); where paintings were completed and held by the tenant at

the disposal of the plaintiff landlord, the former was entitled to be paid the full

price, in accordance with the contract, by being credited with payment of 10
months rent as it became due.
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pleading in dismissing the complaint, since the plaintiff alleged as a separate
transaction th& sale of blood to her by the hospital for a price, and should have
been entitled to prove the existence of the sale at the trial if such allegations were
to be accepted as true, the usual method of testing the sufficiency of a complaint.
At common law,35 a transaction in which personal services predominated did
not preclude a warranty from attaching if title in goods had passed for a price.
However, the Court in the instant case has interpreted the Uniform Sales Act,
adopted in New York,3 6 to require a technical contract of sale for purposes of
finding an implied warranty. Although the decision, in adopting an "essence"
test to find the required contract of sale, restricts the operation of warranties, the
restriction would seem justified in view of the plain import of the words of the
statute, and if found to run counter to legislative policy underlying warranties
may be removed by proper amendment. It should also be noted that this decision
may have been promoted largely by the particular facts of the case (the potential
liability of the hospital as an insurer); therefore the distinction between a contract
of sale and a contract for services, and the adoption of the "essence" test may be
restricted to similar cases.
TAXES
New York Sales Tax-Sales for Resale
The New York City Retail Sales Tax applies to receipts from every sale of
tangible personal property sold to any person for any purpose other than for resale
in the form of tangible personal property. 1 In Colgate-Palmolive Peet Co. v. Joseph,2 petitioner sold certain products, mostly -soaps and toilet articles, encased in
corrugated cardboard cartons, to various retail grocers and druggists in the City
of New York. Whether petitioner is subject to the retail sales tax upon these cartons, which as a general rule are not resold, was the principal issue; the Court
held, that he was. The cartons are not "inseparable from their contents" and are
not sold "for the sole purpose of resale." The order of the Appellate Division3
annulling the determination of the comptroller assessing such tax on petitioner
was reversed.
The rule that containers of articles are separable from their contents for the
35. Samuel v. Davis, [19433 1 K. B. 526 (contract to make dentures).
36.

N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw § 82-158.

1. Administrative Code of the City of New York, Sec. N 41-2.0, subd. a, par.
3. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Joseph, 283 App. Div. 55, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 9
1; Sec. N 41-1.0, subd. 7.
2. 308 N. Y. 333, 125 N. E. 2d 857 (1955).
(1st Dep't 1953).

